Many medical ethicists accept the thesis that there is no moral difference between withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining therapy. In this paper, we offer an interesting counterexample which shows that this thesis is not always true. Withholding is distinguished from withdrawing by the simple fact that therapy must have already been initiated in order to speak coherently about withdrawal. Provided that there is a genuine need and that therapy is biomedically effective, the historicalfact that therapy has been initiated entails a claim to continue therapy that cannot be attributed to patients who have not yet received therapy. This intrinsic difference between withholding and withdrawing therapy is of moral importance. In many instances, patients will waive this claim. But when one considers withdrawing therapy from one patient to help another in a setting ofscarce resources, this intrinsic moral difference comes into sharp focus. In an era of shrinking medical resources, this difference cannot be ignored.
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Several ethicists have argued that despite differences in the emotional reaction of caregivers, there is really no moral difference between withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining therapy (1, 2, 3) . In agreement with these authors, we separate the question of withholding and withdrawing from related questions regarding potential distinctions such as active/passive, act/omission, and killing/ allowing to die (4) . Stated precisely, the Equivalence Thesis we wish to examine asserts that: 1) If Others might suggest that the fact that Secunda is valued more by her parents is a relevant moral difference. And since the twins lack decision-making capacity, the parents seem to be the morally valid surrogates. But in the face of the favouritism shown by the parents, how could one suggest that the parents were either advocating the best interests of Prima or somehow anticipating her own autonomous judgements? Their conflict of interest, apparently favouring one twin over the other, might disqualify them as valid surrogates. In this case, the best argument the parents could make is that they have the right to make decisions like the one faced by the protagonist in Sophie's Choice (8) . In Styron's tragic tale, Sophie is forced to choose which of her two children will be killed by Nazi soldiers in order for her and the remaining child to survive. This forced choice causes Sophie great emotional turmoil and regret. In our case, the parents of Prima and Secunda would be requesting responsibility for a tragic decision that has, in fact, already been made for them. Any claim they might make to a right to such responsibility seems more narcissistic than heroic, and weaker than Prima's claim on the respirator.
IS THIS REALLY JUST A CASE ABOUT SCARCE RESOURCES?
Still others might argue that this is really a classic justice problem about allocating scarce resources and not a case about withholding and withdrawing therapy. While this is a potentially significant objection, we argue that it introduces a false dichotomy. The particularities of this case make it impossible to separate the claims of justice from the distinction between withholding and withdrawing. The difference between withholding and withdrawing, which is inseparable from the difference between being treated now and never having been treated, simply constitutes the justice issue in this case.
Every case in ethics must arise in a particular context. Withholding and withdrawing are only different because something has happened in an unfolding case history: a therapy has been started. Withholding and withdrawing cannot be considered outside of some context. For example, some ethicists argue that withdrawing is often morally preferable to withholding in cases where one needs time to determine whether or not the therapy is effective (9,10) . In fact, this contradicts proposition two of the Equivalence Thesis. In such contexts, it is not true that if it would be, in the future, permissible to withdraw therapy, it is now permissible to withhold therapy. It might be the case that it only becomes permissible to withdraw therapy once one has tried it and concluded that it will fail. The context makes a difference.
JUSTICE AND THE CASH VALUE OF THE DISTINCTION Our argument in this paper is that there is always an intrinsic moral difference between withholding and withdrawing therapy. This difference may be more or less apparent, depending upon the context. The difference lies in the patient's prima facie claim to continue therapy once it has been started. If the patient waives this claim, or if surrogates can construe that the patient would have waived the claim, this difference becomes moot. Since the paradigm cases for discussing withholding and withdrawing are cases where the patient waives the claim to continued therapy and the doctor wants to persist, it has seemed to many that there is no moral difference. But if doctors consider removing a therapy when the patient's claim has not been waived, even if it would have been moral to have withheld that therapy without the patient's consent in the first place, the difference comes into sharp focus.
This sort of circumstance arises in genuine triage settings. Suppose that there is only one ventilator left in an intensive care unit. Suppose that two patients arrive, one with a 50 per cent chance of surviving on a ventilator, and one with a 90 per cent chance of surviving on a ventilator. Without the ventilator, both will die. Other things being equal, most physicians would put the patient with the better chance for survival on the ventilator. In such a situation, even the patients would probably think the decision tragic, but fair.
But if the patient with the 50 per cent chance of survival were already on the only ventilator, and the patient with the better prognosis arrived, also requiring ventilator support, the situation would be different. This is so even though it would have been fair to have withheld the ventilator from the patient with the 50 per cent prognosis for the sake of the patient with the 90 per cent prognosis. Despite the difference in the probability of a good outcome, the patient who is already on the ventilator has at least some claim to continue treatment. And if that is so, withholding and withdrawing are not morally equivalent in such a situation.
Conclusion
If a patient has a genuine medical need for a therapy that is not biomedically futile, and that therapy has been initiated, the patient has a legitimate claim to continue that therapy unless he or she waives this claim. Because this is so, in some circumstances more justification may be required in order to withdraw a therapy than would have been required in order to have withheld it. This refutes proposition one of the Equivalence Thesis. As pointed out above, it is also widely conceded that in certain instances more justification may be required in order to withhold a therapy than would be required in order to withdraw it at a later time. This refutes proposition two of the Equivalence Thesis. We therefore conclude that the Equivalence Thesis is not a universal law of bioethics.
In an era marked by increasing concem regarding the scarcity of medical resources, many feel that our health care facilities are becoming, on both a micro and a macro level, increasingly like Dilemmaland. Our discussion sounds a particularly important cautionary note. Withholding and withdrawing lifesustaining therapy are not morally equivalent acts unless the patient who has been started on a treatment has waived his or her claim to continued treatment. Robbing Peter to pay Paul is different from paying Paul instead of Peter. Continued fronm page 204 response is that actual possession does not of itself determine who ought to possess. Drs Sulmasy and Sugarman have pointed to a real dilemma in practical medical ethics. Their theoretical resolution of that dilemma, despite ingenious thought experimentation, will not, alas, convince all their readers.
